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6 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**

7 MAGALY GRANADOS, individually and on  
8 behalf of all others similarly situated,

9 Plaintiff,

10 v.

11 CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC.,

12 Defendant.  
13

Case No.

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

14 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

15 Plaintiff Magaly Granados, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,  
16 brings this action against Defendant Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. (“Convergent Outsourcing” or  
17 “Defendant”), to obtain damages, restitution and injunctive relief for the Class, as defined below,  
18 from Defendant. Plaintiff makes the following allegations upon information and belief, except as  
19 to her own actions, the investigation of counsel, and the facts that are a matter of public record.  
20

21 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

22 1. Defendant is a large third-party debt collection company with its headquarters in  
23 Renton, Washington.

24 2. In order to provide its debt-collection services, Defendant acquires, stores,  
25 processes, analyzes, and otherwise utilizes Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personally identifiable  
26

1 information, including, but not limited to, name, contact information, financial account numbers,  
2 and Social Security numbers (“Private Information”).

3         3. On June 17, 2022 Defendant discovered an interruption of its services affecting  
4 certain computer system (the “Data Breach”). Through an investigation, Defendant discovered  
5 that “an external actor gained unauthorized access to its systems and deployed a ransomware  
6 malware. The investigation also revealed that the unauthorized actor deployed certain data  
7 extraction tools on one storage drive that is used to save and share files externally.”<sup>1</sup>

8         4. The investigation also revealed that “the following personal information may have  
9 been involved in the unauthorized actor’s access of the internal drive referenced above: name,  
10 contact information, financial account number, and Social Security number.”<sup>2</sup>

11         5. Based upon the investigation, more than 640,000 individuals’ Private Information  
12 was affected in the Data Breach.

13         6. Despite discovering the Data Breach on or around June 17, 2022, Defendant did  
14 not notify Plaintiff and Class Members until October 24, 2022 (“Notice of Data Breach”).

15         7. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and over 640,000 Class Members  
16 suffered injury and ascertainable losses in the form of the present and imminent threat of fraud  
17 and identity theft, loss of the benefit of their bargain, out-of-pocket expenses, loss of value of  
18 their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the attack, and the loss of, and  
19 diminution in, value of their personal information.  
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25 <sup>1</sup> <https://apps.web.maine.gov/online/aeviewer/ME/40/b5be3a2c-d7bd-4b77-83da-d85b55f9dfe8.shtml> (last visited:  
26 November 6, 2022).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*

1           8.       In addition, Plaintiff's and Class Members' sensitive confidential Information was  
2       compromised and unlawfully accessed due to the Data Breach. This information, while  
3       compromised and taken by unauthorized third parties, remains also in the possession of  
4       Defendant, and without additional safeguards and independent review and oversight, remains  
5       vulnerable to additional hackers and theft.  
6

7           9.       Information compromised in the Data Breach includes names, Social Security  
8       numbers, postal addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth and gender, and  
9       potentially other Private Information that Defendant collected and maintained.

10          10.      Defendant did not notify Plaintiff and Class Members that their Private  
11       Information was subject to unauthorized access resulting from the Data Breach until October 24,  
12       2022, over four months after the Data Breach was discovered.  
13

14          11.      The Data Breach was a direct result of Defendant's failure to implement adequate  
15       and reasonable cyber-security procedures and protocols necessary to protect Plaintiff's and Class  
16       Members' Private Information.

17          12.      Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit on behalf of those similarly situated to  
18       address Defendant's inadequate safeguarding of Class Members' Private Information that  
19       Defendant collected and maintained, and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice to  
20       Plaintiff and other Class Members that their information had been subject to the unauthorized  
21       access by an unknown third party.  
22

23          13.      Defendant maintained the Private Information in a reckless manner. In particular,  
24       the Private Information was maintained on Defendant's computer network in a condition  
25       vulnerable to cyberattacks and ransomware malware.  
26

1           14.     The mechanism of the hacking and potential for improper disclosure of Private  
2 Information was a known risk to Defendant and entities like it, and thus Defendant was on notice  
3 that failing to take steps necessary to secure the Private Information from those risks left that  
4 property in a dangerous condition and vulnerable to theft.

5           15.     Defendant disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members (defined below)  
6 by, inter alia, intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and  
7 reasonable measures to ensure its data systems were protected against unauthorized intrusions;  
8 failing to disclose that it did not have adequately robust computer systems and security practices  
9 to safeguard patient Private Information; failing to take standard and reasonably available steps  
10 to prevent the Data Breach; failing to properly train its staff and employees on proper security  
11 measures; and failing to provide Plaintiff and Class Members prompt notice of the Data Breach.  
12

13           16.     In addition, Defendant and its employees failed to properly monitor the computer  
14 network and systems that housed the Private Information. Had Defendant properly monitored its  
15 property, it would have discovered the intrusion sooner, as opposed to letting cybercriminals  
16 roam freely in Defendant's IT network for nearly two full weeks.  
17

18           17.     Plaintiff's and Class Members' identities are now at risk because of Defendant's  
19 negligent conduct since the Private Information that Defendant collected and maintained is now  
20 in the hands of data thieves. This present risk will continue for their respective lifetimes.  
21

22           18.     Armed with the Private Information accessed in the Data Breach, data thieves can  
23 commit a variety of crimes including, e.g., opening new financial accounts in Class Members'  
24 names, taking out loans in Class Members' names, using Class Members' information to obtain  
25 government benefits, filing fraudulent tax returns using Class Members' information, obtaining  
26

1 driver's licenses in Class Members' names but with another person's photograph, and giving  
2 false information to police during an arrest.

3 19. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class Members have been exposed to  
4 a present and imminent risk of fraud and identity theft. Plaintiff and Class Members must now  
5 and in the future closely monitor their financial accounts to guard against identity theft.  
6

7 20. Plaintiff and Class Members will incur out of pocket costs for, e.g., purchasing  
8 credit monitoring services, credit freezes, credit reports, or other protective measures to deter and  
9 detect identity theft.

10 21. Plaintiff seeks to remedy these harms on behalf of herself and all similarly  
11 situated individuals whose Private Information was accessed during the Data Breach.  
12

13 22. Plaintiff seeks remedies including, but not limited to, compensatory damages,  
14 nominal damages, and reimbursement of out-of-pocket costs.

15 23. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive and equitable relief to prevent future injury on  
16 behalf of herself and the putative Class.

17 **PARTIES**

18 24. Plaintiff Magaly Granados is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an individual  
19 citizen of the State of Florida residing in the City of Orlando. Plaintiff received a Notice of Data  
20 Security Incident Letter from Defendant, dated October 26, 2022.  
21

22 25. Defendant Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. is a corporation with its principal place  
23 of business located at 8000 SW 39th St., Ste. 100, Renton, WA 98057.  
24  
25  
26

## **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

26. The Western District of Washington has personal jurisdiction over Defendant named in this action because Defendant and/or its parents or affiliates are headquartered in this District and Defendant conducts substantial business in Washington and this District through its headquarters, offices, parents, and affiliates.

27. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) because this is a class action wherein the amount of controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000 exclusive of interest and costs; there are more than 100 members in the proposed class; and at least one member of the class, including the Plaintiff, are citizens of a state different from Defendant.

28. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant and/or its parents or affiliates are headquartered in this District and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this District.

## **DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS**

29. Defendant is one of "America's leading collection agencies with offices across the country."<sup>3</sup> For more than sixty years, Defendant has worked in the debt collection industry—*i.e.*, helping client outsource debt collection, and assist with the revenue cycle and receivables management.<sup>4</sup>

30. Defendant provides debt-collection services to clients in the telecommunications, utilities, banking, cable, and financial industries.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> <https://www.convergentusa.com/outsourcing/site/who-is-convergent-outsourcing> (last visited Nov. 6, 2022).

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.convergentusa.com/outsourcing/question/list?type=A> (last visited Nov. 4, 2022).

1           31. Defendant obtains the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members in  
2 order to provide debt collection services to its clients.

3           32. On information and belief, Defendant provides each client with a notice of its  
4 privacy practices (the “Privacy Notice”) in respect to how they handle Private Information.  
5

6           33. A copy of the Privacy Notice is maintained on Defendant’s website, and may be  
7 found here: <https://www.convergentusa.com/outsourcing/page/privacy-policy>.

8           34. Defendant’s Privacy Notice states that Defendant is not allowed to disclose  
9 Private Information unless an exception applies. No applicable exception exists in this context.

10           35. Due to the highly sensitive and personal nature of the information Defendant  
11 acquires and stores with respect to its patients, Defendant recognizes privacy rights, and  
12 promises in its Privacy Notice, to, among other things, maintain the privacy of patients’  
13 protected health information, which includes the types of data compromised in this Data Breach.  
14

15           36. Defendant promises to maintain the confidentiality of Plaintiff’s and Class  
16 Members’ Private Information to ensure compliance with federal and state laws and regulations,  
17 and not to use or disclose Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information for any reasons  
18 other than those expressly listed in the Privacy Notice without written authorization.

19           37. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from Plaintiff’s and Class  
20 Members’ Private Information, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties and knew or  
21 should have known that it was responsible for protecting Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private  
22 Information from unauthorized disclosure.  
23  
24  
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38. Plaintiff and the Class Members have taken reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of their Private Information. Defendant failed to implement industry standard protections for that sensitive information.

39. Plaintiff and the Class Members relied on Defendant to keep their Private Information confidential and securely maintained, to use this information for business and health purposes only, and to make only authorized disclosures of this information.

### **THE ATTACK AND DATA BREACH**

40. On June 17, 2022, Defendant identified suspicious activity in its employee email network. Through an investigation, Defendant determined that “an external actor gained unauthorized access to its systems and deployed a ransomware malware. The investigation also revealed that the unauthorized actor deployed certain data extraction tools on one storage drive that is used to save and share files externally.”<sup>6</sup>

41. The investigation also revealed that “the following personal information may have been involved in the unauthorized actor’s access of the internal drive referenced above: name, contact information, financial account number, and Social Security number.”<sup>7</sup>

42. Defendant acknowledges that more than 640,000 individuals’ Private Information was affected in the Data Breach.<sup>8</sup>

43. Based on its investigation, Defendant admits that Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information was accessed and exfiltrated via a ransomware attack conducted by cybercriminals.

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<sup>6</sup> See *supra* Fn. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*

<sup>8</sup> *Id.*





52. In 2019, a record 1,473 data breaches occurred, resulting in approximately 164,683,455 sensitive records being exposed, a 17% increase from 2018.<sup>9</sup> The 525 reported breaches reported in 2019 exposed nearly 40 million sensitive records (39,378,157), compared to only 369 breaches that exposed just over 10 million sensitive records (10,632,600) in 2018.<sup>10</sup> These incidents continue to rise in frequency, with an estimated 1,862 data breaches occurring in 2021.<sup>11</sup>

53. In 2021 alone, there were over 220 data breach incidents.<sup>12</sup> These approximately 220 data breach incidents have impacted nearly 15 million individuals.<sup>13</sup>

54. Indeed, cyberattacks have become so notorious that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and U.S. Secret Service have issued a warning to potential targets so they are aware of, and prepared for, a potential attack. As one report explained, “[e]ntities like smaller municipalities and hospitals are attractive to ransomware criminals... because they often have lesser IT defenses and a high incentive to regain access to their data quickly.”<sup>14</sup>

55. Therefore, the increase in such attacks, and the attendant risk of future attacks, was widely known to the public and to anyone in Defendant’s industry, including Defendant.

<sup>9</sup> [https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/01.28.2020\\_ITRC\\_2019-End-of-Year-Data-Breach-Report\\_FINAL\\_Highres-Appendix.pdf](https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/01.28.2020_ITRC_2019-End-of-Year-Data-Breach-Report_FINAL_Highres-Appendix.pdf) (last accessed June 1, 2021)

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at p15.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/record-number-of-data-breaches-reported-in-2021-new-report-says/>

<sup>12</sup> See Kim Delmonico, Another (!) Orthopedic Practice Reports Data Breach, Orthopedics This Week (May 24, 2021), <https://ryortho.com/breaking/another-orthopedic-practice-reports-data-breach/>.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*

<sup>14</sup> *FBI, Secret Service Warn of Targeted*, Law360 (Nov. 18, 2019), <https://www.law360.com/articles/1220974/fbi-secret-service-warn-of-targeted-ransomware> (last visited July 2, 2021).

**DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY PROTECT PLAINTIFF'S AND CLASS  
MEMBERS' PRIVATE INFORMATION**

56. Defendant did not use reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the sensitive, unencrypted Private Information it was maintaining for Plaintiff and Class Members, causing the exposure of Private Information for more than 640,000 individuals.

***Defendant failed to properly comply with Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") data security standards***

57. The FTC promulgated numerous guides for businesses which highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security practices. According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-making.

58. In 2016, the FTC updated its publication, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, which established cyber-security guidelines for businesses. The guidelines note that businesses should protect the personal patient information that they keep; properly dispose of personal information that is no longer needed; encrypt information stored on computer networks; understand their network's vulnerabilities; and implement policies to correct any security problems. The guidelines also recommend that businesses use an intrusion detection system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating someone is attempting to hack the system; watch for large amounts of data being transmitted from the system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach.<sup>15</sup>

59. The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain PII longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require complex passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for

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<sup>15</sup> *Id.*

1 suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have  
2 implemented reasonable security measures.

3         60. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to  
4 adequately and reasonably protect patient data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and  
5 appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data as an  
6 unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”),  
7 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses must  
8 take to meet their data security obligations.

9  
10         61. These FTC enforcement actions include actions against healthcare providers like  
11 Defendant. See, e.g., *In the Matter of Labmd, Inc.*, A Corp, 2016-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 79708,  
12 2016 WL 4128215, at \*32 (MSNET July 28, 2016) (“[T]he Commission concludes that  
13 LabMD’s data security practices were unreasonable and constitute an unfair act or practice in  
14 violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.”)

15  
16         62. Defendant failed to properly implement basic data security practices explained  
17 and set forth by the FTC.

18         63. Defendant’s failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect  
19 against unauthorized access to patients’ Private Information constitutes an unfair act or practice  
20 prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

21  
22         64. Defendant was at all times fully aware of its obligation to protect the Private  
23 Information of its patients. Defendant was also aware of the significant repercussions that would  
24 result from its failure to do so.

*Defendant failed to comply with industry standards*

65. Defendant did not utilize industry standards appropriate to the nature of the sensitive, unencrypted information they were maintaining for Plaintiff and Class Members, causing the exposure of Private Information for more than 640,000 individuals.

66. As explained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “[p]revention is the most effective defense against cyberattacks] and it is critical to take precautions for protection.”<sup>16</sup>

67. To prevent and detect cyberattacks, including the cyberattack that resulted in the Data Breach, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Government, the following measures:

- Implement an awareness and training program. Because end users are targets, employees and individuals should be aware of the threat of cyberattacks and how it is delivered.
- Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users and authenticate inbound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent email spoofing.
- Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files from reaching end users.
- Configure firewalls to block access to known malicious IP addresses.
- Patch operating systems, software, and firmware on devices. Consider using a centralized patch management system.
- Set anti-virus and anti-malware programs to conduct regular scans automatically.
- Manage the use of privileged accounts based on the principle of least privilege: no users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed; and those with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when necessary.

<sup>16</sup> See How to Protect Your Networks from RANSOMWARE, at 3, available at <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ransomware-prevention-and-response-for-cisos.pdf/view> (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).

- Configure access controls—including file, directory, and network share permissions—with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files, the user should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares.
- Disable macro scripts from office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full office suite applications.
- Implement Software Restriction Policies (SRP) or other controls to prevent programs from executing from common cyberware locations, such as temporary folders supporting popular Internet browsers or compression/decompression programs, including the AppData/LocalAppData folder.
- Consider disabling Remote Desktop protocol (RDP) if it is not being used.
- Use application whitelisting, which only allows systems to execute programs known and permitted by security policy.
- Execute operating system environments or specific programs in a virtualized environment.
- Categorize data based on organizational value and implement physical and logical separation of networks and data for different organizational units.<sup>17</sup>

68. To prevent and detect ransomware attacks, including the ransomware attack that resulted in the Data Breach, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, the following measures:

- **Update and patch your computer.** Ensure your applications and operating systems (OSs) have been updated with the latest patches. Vulnerable applications and OSs are the target of most ransomware attacks....
- **Use caution with links and when entering website addresses.** Be careful when clicking directly on links in emails, even if the sender appears to be someone you know. Attempt to independently verify website addresses (e.g., contact your organization's helpdesk, search the internet for the sender organization's website or the topic mentioned in the email). Pay attention to the website addresses you click on, as well as those you enter yourself. Malicious website addresses often appear

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<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 3-4.

almost identical to legitimate sites, often using a slight variation in spelling or a different domain (e.g., .com instead of .net)....

- **Open email attachments with caution.** Be wary of opening email attachments, even from senders you think you know, particularly when attachments are compressed files or ZIP files.
- **Keep your personal information safe.** Check a website's security to ensure the information you submit is encrypted before you provide it....
- **Verify email senders.** If you are unsure whether or not an email is legitimate, try to verify the email's legitimacy by contacting the sender directly. Do not click on any links in the email. If possible, use a previous (legitimate) email to ensure the contact information you have for the sender is authentic before you contact them.
- **Inform yourself.** Keep yourself informed about recent cybersecurity threats and up to date on ransomware techniques. You can find information about known phishing attacks on the Anti-Phishing Working Group website. You may also want to sign up for CISA product notifications, which will alert you when a new Alert, Analysis Report, Bulletin, Current Activity, or Tip has been published.
- **Use and maintain preventative software programs.** Install antivirus software, firewalls, and email filters—and keep them updated—to reduce malicious network traffic....<sup>18</sup>

69. To prevent and detect cyberattacks, including the cyberattack that resulted in the Data Breach, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team, the following measures:

**Secure internet-facing assets**

- Apply latest security updates
- Use threat and vulnerability management
- Perform regular audit; remove privileged credentials;

**Thoroughly investigate and remediate alerts**

- Prioritize and treat commodity malware infections as potential full compromise;

<sup>18</sup> See Security Tip (ST19-001) Protecting Against Ransomware (original release date Apr. 11, 2019), *available at* <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST19-001> (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).

**Include IT Pros in security discussions**

- Ensure collaboration among [security operations], [security admins], and [information technology] admins to configure servers and other endpoints securely;

**Build credential hygiene**

- Use [multifactor authentication] or [network level authentication] and use strong, randomized, just-in-time local admin passwords

**Apply principle of least-privilege**

- Monitor for adversarial activities
- Hunt for brute force attempts
- Monitor for cleanup of Event Logs
- Analyze logon events

**Harden infrastructure**

- Use Windows Defender Firewall
- Enable tamper protection
- Enable cloud-delivered protection
- Turn on attack surface reduction rules and [Antimalware Scan Interface] for Office [Visual Basic for Applications].<sup>19</sup>

70. As described above, experts studying cyber security routinely identify healthcare providers as being particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because of the value of the PII which they collect and maintain.

71. Several best practices have been identified that at a minimum should be implemented by healthcare providers like Defendant, including, but not limited to, the following: educating all employees; strong passwords; multi-layer security, including firewalls, anti-virus,

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<sup>19</sup> See Human-operated ransomware attacks: A preventable disaster (Mar 5, 2020), *available at* <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/> (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).



1 and anti-malware software; encryption, making data unreadable without a key; multi-factor  
2 authentication; backup data, and; limiting which employees can access sensitive data.

3 72. Other best cybersecurity practices that are standard in the healthcare industry  
4 include installing appropriate malware detection software; monitoring and limiting the network  
5 ports; protecting web browsers and email management systems; setting up network systems such  
6 as firewalls, switches and routers; monitoring and protection of physical security systems;  
7 protection against any possible communication system; training staff regarding critical points.  
8

9 73. Defendant failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following  
10 frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 (including without limitation  
11 PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.AT-1, PR.DS-1, PR.DS-5,  
12 PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7, DE.CM-8, and RS.CO-2), and the Center  
13 for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS CSC), which are all established standards  
14 in reasonable cybersecurity readiness.  
15

16 74. These foregoing frameworks are existing and applicable industry standards in the  
17 healthcare industry, and Defendant failed to comply with these accepted standards, thereby  
18 opening the door to and causing the Data Breach.

19 75. Given that Defendant was storing the Private Information of more than 640,000  
20 individuals—and likely much more than that—Defendant could and should have implemented  
21 all of the above measures to prevent cyberattacks.  
22

23 76. The occurrence of the Data Brach indicates that Defendant failed to adequately  
24 implement one or more of the above measures to prevent cyberattacks, resulting in the Data  
25 Breach and the exposure of approximately 640,000 individuals' Private Information.  
26

**DEFENDANT'S BREACH**

***Defendant failed to properly protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information***

77. Defendant breached its obligations to Plaintiff and Class Members and was otherwise negligent and reckless because it failed to properly maintain and safeguard its computer systems and data. Defendant's unlawful conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following acts and/or omissions:

- a. Failing to maintain an adequate data security system to reduce the risk of data breaches, cyber-attacks, hacking incidents, and ransomware attacks;
- b. Failing to adequately protect patients' Private Information;
- c. Failing to properly monitor its own data security systems for existing or prior intrusions;
- d. Failing to comply with FTC guidelines for cybersecurity, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, and;
- e. Failing to adhere to industry standards for cybersecurity.

78. As the result of computer systems in need of security upgrades, inadequate procedures for handling email phishing attacks, viruses, malignant computer code, hacking attacks, Defendant negligently and unlawfully failed to safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.

79. Accordingly, as outlined below, Plaintiff and Class Members now face a present, increased, and immediate risk of fraud and identity theft.

***Cyberattacks and data breaches cause disruption and put individuals at an increased risk of fraud and identity theft***

80. The United States Government Accountability Office released a report in 2007 regarding data breaches (“GAO Report”) in which it noted that victims of identity theft will face “substantial costs and time to repair the damage to their good name and credit record.”<sup>20</sup>

81. That is because any victim of a data breach is exposed to serious ramifications regardless of the nature of the data. Indeed, the reason criminals steal personally identifiable information is to monetize it. They do this by selling the spoils of their cyberattacks on the black market to identity thieves who desire to extort and harass victims, take over victims’ identities in order to engage in illegal financial transactions under the victims’ names. Because a person’s identity is akin to a puzzle, the more accurate pieces of data an identity thief obtains about a person, the easier it is for the thief to take on the victim’s identity, or otherwise harass or track the victim. For example, armed with just a name and date of birth, a data thief can utilize a hacking technique referred to as “social engineering” to obtain even more information about a victim’s identity, such as a person’s login credentials or Social Security number. Social engineering is a form of hacking whereby a data thief uses previously acquired information to manipulate individuals into disclosing additional confidential or personal information through means such as spam phone calls and text messages or phishing emails.

82. The FTC recommends that identity theft victims take several steps to protect their personal and financial information after a data breach, including contacting one of the credit bureaus to place a fraud alert (consider an extended fraud alert that lasts for 7 years if someone

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<sup>20</sup> See U.S. Gov. Accounting Office, GAO-07-737, Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown (2007). Available at <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.

1 steals their identity), reviewing their credit reports, contacting companies to remove fraudulent  
2 charges from their accounts, placing a credit freeze on their credit, and correcting their credit  
3 reports.<sup>21</sup>

4 83. Identity thieves use stolen personal information such as Social Security numbers  
5 for a variety of crimes, including credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank/finance  
6 fraud.  
7

8 84. Identity thieves can also use Social Security numbers to obtain a driver's license  
9 or official identification card in the victim's name but with the thief's picture; use the victim's  
10 name and Social Security number to obtain government benefits; or file a fraudulent tax return  
11 using the victim's information. In addition, identity thieves may obtain a job using the victim's  
12 Social Security number, rent a house in the victim's name, and may even give the victim's  
13 personal information to police during an arrest resulting in an arrest warrant being issued in the  
14 victim's name.  
15


16 85. A study by Identity Theft Resource Center shows the multitude of harms caused  
17 by fraudulent use of personal and financial information:<sup>22</sup>  
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25 <sup>21</sup> See *IdentityTheft.gov*, Federal Trade Commission, <https://www.identitytheft.gov/Steps> (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).

26 <sup>22</sup> See Jason Steele, *Credit Card and ID Theft Statistics*, CreditCards.com (Oct. 23, 2020)  
<https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-security-id-theft-fraud-statistics-1276.php>.

## Americans' expenses/disruptions as a result of criminal activity in their name [2016]



86. Moreover, theft of Private Information is also gravely serious. PII are extremely valuable property rights.<sup>23</sup>

87. Its value is axiomatic, considering the value of “big data” in corporate America and the fact that the consequences of cyber thefts include heavy prison sentences. Even this obvious risk to reward analysis illustrates beyond doubt that Private Information has considerable market value.

<sup>23</sup> See, e.g., John T. Soma, et al, Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 11, at \*3-4 (2009) (“PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial assets.”) (citations omitted).

1           88. It must also be noted there may be a substantial time lag – measured in years --  
2 between when harm occurs and when it is discovered, and also between when Private  
3 Information and/or financial information is stolen and when it is used.

4           89. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which conducted a  
5 study regarding data breaches:  
6

7                   [L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data  
8 may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit  
9 identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on  
10 the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for  
11 years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm  
12 resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future  
13 harm.

14 *See* GAO Report, at p. 29.

15           90. Private Information is such a valuable commodity to identity thieves that once the  
16 information has been compromised, criminals often trade the information on the “cyber black-  
17 market” for years.

18           91. There is a strong probability that entire batches of stolen information have been  
19 dumped on the black market and are yet to be dumped on the black market, meaning Plaintiff  
20 and Class Members are at an increased risk of fraud and identity theft for many years into the  
21 future.

22           92. Thus, Plaintiff and Class Members must vigilantly monitor their financial for  
23 many years to come.  
24  
25  
26

1           93. Sensitive Private Information can sell for as much as \$363 per record according to  
2 the Infosec Institute.<sup>24</sup> PII is particularly valuable because criminals can use it to target victims  
3 with frauds and scams. Once PII is stolen, fraudulent use of that information and damage to  
4 victims may continue for years.

5           94. For example, the Social Security Administration has warned that identity thieves  
6 can use an individual's Social Security number to apply for additional credit lines.<sup>25</sup> Such fraud  
7 may go undetected until debt collection calls commence months, or even years, later. Stolen  
8 Social Security Numbers also make it possible for thieves to file fraudulent tax returns, file for  
9 unemployment benefits, or apply for a job using a false identity.<sup>26</sup> Each of these fraudulent  
10 activities is difficult to detect. An individual may not know that his or her Social Security  
11 Number was used to file for unemployment benefits until law enforcement notifies the  
12 individual's employer of the suspected fraud. Fraudulent tax returns are typically discovered  
13 only when an individual's authentic tax return is rejected.

14           95. Moreover, it is not an easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security  
15 number.

16           96. An individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant  
17 paperwork and evidence of actual misuse. Even then, a new Social Security number may not be  
18 effective, as "[t]he credit bureaus and banks are able to link the new number very quickly to the  
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24 <sup>24</sup> See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015),  
25 <https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/>.

26 <sup>25</sup> *Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number*, Social Security Administration (2018) at 1. Available at  
<https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10064.pdf> (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).

<sup>26</sup> *Id* at 4.

old number, so all of that old bad information is quickly inherited into the new Social Security number.”<sup>27</sup>

97. This data, as one would expect, demands a much higher price on the black market. Martin Walter, senior director at cybersecurity firm RedSeal, explained, “[c]ompared to credit card information, personally identifiable information and Social Security Numbers are worth more than 10x on the black market.”<sup>28</sup>

98. For this reason, Defendant knew or should have known about these dangers and strengthened its network and data security systems accordingly. Defendant was put on notice of the substantial and foreseeable risk of harm from a data breach, yet it failed to properly prepare for that risk.

***Plaintiff Granado’s and Class Members’ harms and damages***

99. To date, Defendant has done little to adequately protect Plaintiff and Class Members, or to compensate them for their injuries sustained in this data breach. Defendant’s data breach notice letter completely downplays and disavows the theft of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information, when the facts demonstrate that the Private Information was accessed and exfiltrated. The complimentary fraud and identity monitoring service offered by Defendant is wholly inadequate as the services are only offered for 12 months and it places the burden squarely on Plaintiff’s and Class Members by requiring them to expend time signing up for that service, as opposed to automatically enrolling all victims of this cybercrime.

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<sup>27</sup> Brian Naylor, *Victims of Social Security Number Theft Find It’s Hard to Bounce Back*, NPR (Feb. 9, 2015), <http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millions-worrying-about-identity-theft>.

<sup>28</sup> Tim Greene, *Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10x Price of Stolen Credit Card Numbers*, Computer World (Feb. 6, 2015), <http://www.itworld.com/article/2880960/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html>.



1           100. Plaintiff and Class Members have been injured and damaged by the compromise  
2 of their Private Information in the Data Breach.

3           101. Plaintiff's Private Information (including without limitation her name, contact  
4 information, financial account number, and Social Security number) was compromised in the  
5 Data Breach and is now in the hands of the cybercriminals who accessed Defendant's network.  
6 Class Members' Private Information, as described above, was similarly compromised and is now  
7 in the hands of the same cybercriminals.  
8

9           102. Plaintiff typically takes measures to protect her Private Information and is very  
10 careful about sharing her Private Information. Plaintiff has never knowingly transmitted  
11 unencrypted Private Information over the internet or any other unsecured source.  
12

13           103. Plaintiff stores any documents containing her Private Information in a safe and  
14 secure location. Moreover, Plaintiff diligently chooses unique usernames and passwords for her  
15 online accounts.

16           104. To the best of her knowledge, Plaintiff's Private Information was never  
17 compromised in any other data breach.

18           105. Plaintiff and Class Members face substantial risk of out-of-pocket fraud losses  
19 such as loans opened in their names, tax return fraud, utility bills opened in their names, and  
20 similar identity theft.  
21

22           106. Plaintiff and Class Members face substantial risk of being targeted for future  
23 phishing, data intrusion, and other illegal schemes based on their Private Information as potential  
24 fraudsters could use that information to target such schemes more effectively to Plaintiff and  
25 Class Members.  
26

1           107. Plaintiff and Class Members will also incur out-of-pocket costs for protective  
2 measures such as credit monitoring fees (for any credit monitoring obtained in addition to or in  
3 lieu of the inadequate monitoring offered by Defendant), credit report fees, credit freeze fees,  
4 and similar costs directly or indirectly related to the Data Breach.  
5

6           108. Plaintiff and Class Members also suffered a loss of value of their Private  
7 Information when it was acquired by the hacker and cyber thieves in the Data Breach. Numerous  
8 courts have recognized the propriety of loss of value damages in related cases.

9           109. Plaintiff and Class Members were also damaged via benefit-of-the-bargain  
10 damages. Plaintiff and Class Members overpaid for a service that was intended to be  
11 accompanied by adequate data security but was not. Part of the price Plaintiff and Class  
12 Members paid to Defendant was intended to be used by Defendant to fund adequate security of  
13 Defendant's computer property and protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.  
14 Thus, Plaintiff and the Class Members did not get what they paid for.  
15

16           110. Plaintiff and Class Members have spent and will continue to spend significant  
17 amounts of time monitoring their financial accounts and records for misuse. Indeed, Defendant's  
18 own notice of data breach provides instructions to Plaintiff and Class Members about all the time  
19 that they will need to spend monitor their own accounts and statements received from healthcare  
20 providers and health insurance plans.  
21

22           111. Plaintiff spent many hours over the course of several days attempting to verify the  
23 veracity of the notice of breach that he received and to monitor her financial and online accounts  
24 for evidence of fraudulent activities.  
25  
26

1           112. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered actual injury as a direct result of the  
2 Data Breach. Many victims suffered ascertainable losses in the form of out-of-pocket expenses  
3 and the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the Data  
4 Breach relating to:

- 5           a. Finding fraudulent loans, insurance claims, tax returns, and/or government  
6           benefit claims;
- 7           b. Purchasing credit monitoring and identity theft prevention;
- 8           c. Placing “freezes” and “alerts” with credit reporting agencies;
- 9           d. Spending time on the phone with or at a financial institution or government  
10           agency to dispute fraudulent charges and/or claims;
- 11           e. Contacting financial institutions and closing or modifying financial accounts;
- 12           f. Closely reviewing and monitoring Social Security Number, bank accounts, and  
13           credit reports for unauthorized activity for years to come.

14           113. Moreover, Plaintiff and Class Members have an interest in ensuring that their  
15 Private Information, which is believed to remain in the possession of Defendant, is protected  
16 from further breaches by the implementation of security measures and safeguards, including but  
17 not limited to, making sure that the storage of data or documents containing sensitive and  
18 confidential personal, health, and/or financial information is not accessible online, that access to  
19 such data is password-protected, and that such data is properly encrypted.

20           114. Further, as a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members are  
21 forced to live with the anxiety that their Private Information may be disclosed to the entire world,  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

1 thereby subjecting them to embarrassment and depriving them of any right to privacy  
 2 whatsoever.

3 115. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's actions and inactions, Plaintiff  
 4 and Class Members have suffered a loss of privacy and are at a present and imminent and  
 5 increased risk of future harm.  
 6

### 7 **CLASS REPRESENTATION ALLEGATIONS**

8 116. Plaintiff brings this nationwide class action on behalf of herself and on behalf of  
 9 others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of  
 10 Civil Procedure.

11 117. The Nationwide Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows:  
 12

13 All United States residents whose Private Information was accessed or acquired  
 14 during the data breach event that is the subject of the Notice of Data Breach that  
 15 Defendant sent to Plaintiff and other Class Members on or around June 10, 2022  
 16 (the "Nationwide Class").

17 118. Excluded from the Class are Defendant's officers, directors, and employees; any  
 18 entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest; and the affiliates, legal representatives,  
 19 attorneys, successors, heirs, and assigns of Defendant. Excluded also from the Class are  
 20 Members of the judiciary to whom this case is assigned, their families and Members of their  
 21 staff.

22 119. Numerosity, Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1): The Nationwide Class (the "Class") are so  
 23 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Defendant has identified hundreds of  
 24 thousands of individuals whose Private Information may have been improperly accessed in the  
 25 Data Breach, and the Class is apparently identifiable within Defendant's records. Defendant  
 26

1 advised the United States Department of Health and Human Services that the Data Breach  
2 affected more than 1,100,000 individuals.

3 120. Commonality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3): Questions of law and fact  
4 common to the Classes exist and predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class  
5 Members. These include:  
6

- 7 a. Whether Defendant unlawfully used, maintained, lost, or disclosed  
8 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information;
- 9 b. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable  
10 security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and  
11 scope of the information compromised in the hacking incident and  
12 Data Breach;
- 13 c. Whether Defendant's data security systems prior to and during the  
14 hacking incident and Data Breach complied with applicable data  
15 security laws and regulations;
- 16 d. Whether Defendant's data security systems prior to and during the  
17 Data Breach were consistent with industry standards;
- 18 e. Whether Defendant owed a duty to Class Members to safeguard  
19 their Private Information;
- 20 f. Whether Defendant breached its duty to Class Members to  
21 safeguard their Private Information;
- 22 g. Whether computer hackers obtained Class Members' Private  
23 Information in the Data Breach;
- 24
- 25
- 26

- h. Whether Defendant knew or should have known that its data security systems and monitoring processes were deficient;
- i. Whether Defendant owed a duty to provide Plaintiff and Class Members notice of this Data Breach, and whether Defendant breached that duty to provide timely notice;
- j. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members suffered legally cognizable damages as a result of Defendant's misconduct;
- k. Whether Defendant's conduct was negligent;
- l. Whether Defendant's conduct was *per se* negligent;
- m. Whether Defendant's acts, inactions, and practices complained of herein amount to acts of intrusion upon seclusion under the law;
- n. Whether Defendant was unjustly enriched
- o. Whether Defendant's conduct violated federal law;
- p. Whether Defendant's conduct violated state law;
- q. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to damages, civil penalties, and/or punitive damages.

121. Common sources of evidence may also be used to demonstrate Defendant's unlawful conduct on a class-wide basis, including, but not limited to, documents and testimony about its data and cybersecurity measures (or lack thereof); testing and other methods that can prove Defendant's data and cybersecurity systems have been or remain inadequate; documents and testimony about the source, cause, and extent of the Data Breach; and documents and testimony about any remedial efforts undertaken as a result of the Data Breach.

1           122. Typicality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3): Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of other  
2 Class Members because all had their PII compromised as a result of the Data Breach and due to  
3 Defendant's misfeasance.

4           123. Adequacy, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4): Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent  
5 and protect the interests of the Class Members in that he has no disabling conflicts of interest that  
6 would be antagonistic to those of the other Members of the Class. Plaintiffs seek no relief that is  
7 antagonistic or adverse to the Members of the Class and the infringement of the rights and the  
8 damages they has suffered are typical of other Class Members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel  
9 experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiffs intend to prosecute this action  
10 vigorously.

11           124. Predominance, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3). Defendant has engaged in a common  
12 course of conduct toward Plaintiff and Class Members, in that all the Plaintiff's and Class  
13 Members' data was stored on the same computer systems and unlawfully accessed in the same  
14 way. The common issues arising from Defendant's conduct affecting Class Members set out  
15 above predominate over any individualized issues. Adjudication of these common issues in a  
16 single action has important and desirable advantages of judicial economy.

17           125. Superiority and Manageability, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3): The class litigation is an  
18 appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved. Class action  
19 treatment is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the  
20 controversy alleged herein; it will permit a large number of Class Members to prosecute their  
21 common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary  
22 duplication of evidence, effort, and expense that hundreds of individual actions would require.  
23  
24  
25  
26

1 Class action treatment will permit the adjudication of relatively modest claims by certain Class  
2 Members, who could not individually afford to litigate a complex claim against large  
3 corporations, like Defendant. Further, even for those Class Members who could afford to litigate  
4 such a claim, it would still be economically impractical and impose a burden on the courts.  
5

6 126. The nature of this action and the nature of laws available to Plaintiffs and Class  
7 Members make the use of the class action device a particularly efficient and appropriate  
8 procedure to afford relief to Plaintiffs and Class Members for the wrongs alleged because  
9 Defendant would necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage since they would be able to  
10 exploit and overwhelm the limited resources of each individual Class Member with superior  
11 financial and legal resources; the costs of individual suits could unreasonably consume the  
12 amounts that would be recovered; proof of a common course of conduct to which Plaintiffs were  
13 exposed is representative of that experienced by the Class and will establish the right of each  
14 Class Member to recover on the cause of action alleged; and individual actions would create a  
15 risk of inconsistent results and would be unnecessary and duplicative of this litigation.  
16

17 127. The litigation of the claims brought herein is manageable. Defendant's uniform  
18 conduct, the consistent provisions of the relevant laws, and the ascertainable identities of Class  
19 Members demonstrates that there would be no significant manageability problems with  
20 prosecuting this lawsuit as a class action.  
21

22 128. Adequate notice can be given to Class Members directly using information  
23 maintained in Defendant's records.

24 129. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendant may continue in its failure to  
25 properly secure the Private Information of Class Members, Defendant may continue to refuse to  
26



1 provide proper notification to Class Members regarding the Data Breach, and Defendant may  
2 continue to act unlawfully as set forth in this Complaint.

3 130. Further, Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to  
4 the Classes and, accordingly, final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with regard to  
5 the Class Members as a whole is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil  
6 Procedure.  
7

8 131. Likewise, particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4) are appropriate for certification  
9 because such claims present only particular, common issues, the resolution of which would  
10 advance the disposition of this matter and the parties' interests therein. Such particular issues  
11 include, but are not limited to:

- 12 a. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to  
13 exercise due care in collecting, storing, using, and safeguarding their PII;
- 14 b. Whether Defendant breached a legal duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to  
15 exercise due care in collecting, storing, using, and safeguarding their PII;
- 16 c. Whether Defendant failed to comply with its own policies and applicable laws,  
17 regulations, and industry standards relating to data security;
- 18 d. Whether Defendant adequately and accurately informed Plaintiffs and Class  
19 Members that their PII had been compromised;
- 20 e. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security  
21 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information  
22 compromised in the Data Breach;
- 23  
24  
25  
26

1 f. Whether Defendant engaged in unfair, unlawful, or deceptive practices by failing  
2 to safeguard the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members; and,

3 g. Whether Class Members are entitled to actual, consequential, and/or nominal  
4 damages, and/or injunctive relief as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct.

5  
6 132. Defendant acted on grounds that apply generally to the Class as a whole, so that  
7 Class certification and the corresponding relief sought are appropriate on a Class-wide basis.

8 133. Finally, all members of the proposed Class are readily ascertainable. Defendant  
9 has access to Class Members' names and addresses affected by the Data Breach. Class Members  
10 have already been preliminarily identified and sent notice of the Data Breach by Defendant.

11 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

12 **FIRST COUNT**

13 **Violation of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act**  
14 **(RCW 19.86.010 *et seq.*)**  
15 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

16 134. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in all  
17 previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

18 135. The Washington State Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020 (the "CPA")  
19 prohibits any "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in the conduct of any trade or commerce as  
20 those terms are described by the CPA and relevant case law.

21 136. Defendant is a "person" as described in RWC 19.86.010(1).

22 137. Defendant engages in "trade" and "commerce" as described in RWC 19.86.010(2)  
23 in that they engage in the sale of services and commerce directly and indirectly affecting the  
24 people of the State of Washington.

25 138. Defendant is headquartered in Washington; its strategies, decision-making, and  
26

1 commercial transactions originate in Washington; most of its key operations and employees reside,  
2 work, and make company decisions (including data security decisions) in Washington; and  
3 Defendant and many of its employees are part of the people of the State of Washington.

4  
5 139. In the course of conducting their business, Defendant committed “unfair acts or  
6 practices” by, inter alia, knowingly failing to design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee,  
7 manage, monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies, procedures,  
8 protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class  
9 Members’ Private Information. Plaintiff and Class Members reserve the right to allege other  
10 violations of law by Defendant constituting other unlawful business acts or practices. As  
11 described above, Defendant’s unfair acts and practices ongoing and continue to this date.

12  
13 140. Defendant’s conduct was also deceptive. Defendant failed to timely notify and  
14 concealing from Plaintiff and Class Members the unauthorized release and disclosure of their  
15 Private Information. If Plaintiff and Class Members had been notified in an appropriate fashion,  
16 and had the information not been hidden from them, they could have taken precautions to  
17 safeguard and protect their Private Information and identities.

18  
19 141. Defendant’s above-described “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in violation  
20 effects the public interest because it is substantially injurious to persons, had the capacity to  
21 injure other persons, and has the capacity to injure other persons.

22  
23 142. The gravity of Defendant’s wrongful conduct outweighs any alleged benefits  
24 attributable to such conduct. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendant’s  
25 legitimate business interests other than engaging in the above-described wrongful conduct.  
26

1           143. Defendant's above-described unfair and deceptive acts and practices directly and  
2 proximately caused injury to Plaintiff and Class Members' business and property. Plaintiff and  
3 Class Members have suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual damages and injury in the form  
4 of, inter alia, (1) an imminent, immediate and the continuing increased risk of identity theft,  
5 identity fraud—risks justifying expenditures for protective and remedial services for which he or  
6 she is entitled to compensation; (2) invasion of privacy; (3) breach of the confidentiality of his or  
7 her Private Information; (5) deprivation of the value of his or her Private Information, for which  
8 there is a well-established national and international market; (6) the financial and temporal cost  
9 of monitoring credit, monitoring financial accounts, and mitigating damages; and/or (7)  
10 investment of substantial time and money to monitoring and remediating the harm inflicted upon  
11 them.  
12

13           144. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendant will continue to engage in the above-  
14 described wrongful conduct and more data breaches will occur. Plaintiff, therefore, on behalf of  
15 herself, Class Members, and the general public, also seeks restitution and an injunction  
16 prohibiting Defendant from continuing such wrongful conduct, and requiring Defendant to  
17 modify their corporate culture and design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee, manage,  
18 monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies, procedures protocols,  
19 and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect Private Information.  
20

21           145. Plaintiff, on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members, also seeks to recover  
22 actual damages sustained by each class member together with the costs of the suit, including  
23 reasonable attorney fees. In addition, Plaintiff, on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members,  
24 requests that this Court use its discretion, pursuant to RCW 19.86.090, to increase the damages  
25  
26

1 award for each class member by three times the actual damages sustained not to exceed  
2 \$25,000.00 per class member.

3 **SECOND COUNT**  
4 **Negligence**  
5 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

6 146. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in all  
7 previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

8 147. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class members.

9 148. Defendant knowingly collected, came into possession of, and maintained  
10 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information, and had a duty to exercise reasonable care in  
11 safeguarding, securing and protecting such information from being compromised, lost, stolen,  
12 misused, and/or disclosed to unauthorized parties.

13 149. Defendant had, and continues to have, a duty to timely disclose that Plaintiff's  
14 and Class Members' Private Information within their possession was compromised and precisely  
15 the type(s) of information that were compromised.

16 150. Defendant had a duty to have procedures in place to detect and prevent the loss or  
17 unauthorized dissemination of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.

18 151. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members to provide data  
19 security consistent with industry standards, applicable standards of care from statutory authority  
20 like Section 5 of the FTC Act, and other requirements discussed herein, and to ensure that their  
21 systems and networks, and the personnel responsible for them, adequately protected the Private  
22 Information.  
23  
24  
25  
26

1           152. Defendant's duty of care to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of  
2 the special relationship that existed between Defendant and its Class Members, which is  
3 recognized by laws and regulations, as well as common law. Defendant was in a position to  
4 ensure that its systems were sufficient to protect against the foreseeable risk of harm to Class  
5 Members from a data breach.  
6

7           153. In addition, Defendant had a duty to employ reasonable security measures under  
8 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits "unfair . . .  
9 practices in or affecting commerce," including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the  
10 unfair practice of failing to use reasonable measures to protect confidential data.  
11

12           154. Defendant's duty to use reasonable care in protecting confidential data arose not  
13 only as a result of the statutes and regulations described above, but also because Defendant is  
14 bound by industry standards to protect confidential Private Information.

15           155. Defendant systematically failed to provide adequate security for data in its  
16 possession.

17           156. The specific negligent acts and omissions committed by Defendant include, but  
18 are not limited to, the following:

- 19           a. Upon information and belief, mishandling emails, so as to allow for  
20 unauthorized person(s) to access Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private  
21 Information;  
22           b. Failing to adopt, implement, and maintain adequate security measures to  
23 safeguard Class Members' Private Information;  
24           c. Failing to adequately monitor the security of their networks and systems;  
25  
26

1 d. Failure to periodically ensure that their computer systems and networks had  
2 plans in place to maintain reasonable data security safeguards.

3 157. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached their duty to  
4 Plaintiff and Class members by failing to exercise reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding  
5 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information within Defendant's possession.  
6

7 158. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached their duty to  
8 Plaintiff and Class members by failing to have appropriate procedures in place to detect and  
9 prevent dissemination of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.

10 159. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached their duty to  
11 timely disclose to Plaintiff and Class Members that the Private Information within Defendant's  
12 possession might have been compromised and precisely the type of information compromised.  
13

14 160. It was foreseeable that Defendant's failure to use reasonable measures to protect  
15 Plaintiff and Class Members' Private Information would result in injury to Plaintiff and Class  
16 Members.

17 161. It was foreseeable that the failure to adequately safeguard Plaintiff and Class  
18 Members' Private Information would result in injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members.

19 162. Defendant's breach of duties owed to Plaintiff and Class Members caused  
20 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to be compromised.  
21

22 163. As a result of Defendant's ongoing failure to notify Plaintiff and Class Members  
23 regarding what type of Private Information has been compromised, Plaintiff and Class Members  
24 are unable to take the necessary precautions to mitigate damages by preventing future fraud.  
25  
26

1           164. Defendant's breaches of duty caused Plaintiff and Class Members to suffer from  
2 identity theft, loss of time and money to monitor their finances for fraud, and loss of control over  
3 their Private Information.

4           165. As a result of Defendant's negligence and breach of duties, Plaintiff and Class  
5 Members are in danger of imminent harm in that their Private Information, which is still in the  
6 possession of third parties, will be used for fraudulent purposes.

7           166. Plaintiff seeks the award of actual damages on behalf of the Class. Plaintiff seeks  
8 injunctive relief on behalf of the Class in the form of an order (1) compelling Defendant to  
9 institute appropriate data collection and safeguarding methods and policies with regard to patient  
10 information; and (2) compelling Defendant to provide detailed and specific disclosure of what  
11 types of Private Information have been compromised as a result of the data breach.  
12

13  
14                                   **THIRD COUNT**  
15                                   **Negligence *per se***  
16                                   **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

17           167. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in all  
18 previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

19           168. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45),  
20 Defendant had a duty to provide fair and adequate computer systems and data security practices  
21 to safeguard Plaintiff and Class Members' Private Information.

22           169. Plaintiff and Class Members are within the class of persons that the FTCA was  
23 intended to protect.

24           170. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm the  
25 FTCA was intended to guard against. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against  
26



1 businesses, which, as a result of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and  
2 avoid unfair and deceptive practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiff and the  
3 Class.

4 171. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm that the  
5 Federal Trade Commission Act was intended to guard against.

6 172. Defendant breached their duties to Plaintiff and Class Members under the Federal  
7 Trade Commission Act, by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer systems and  
8 data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.

9 173. Defendant's failure to comply with applicable laws and regulations constitutes  
10 negligence per se.

11 174. But for Defendant's wrongful and negligent breach of its duties owed to Plaintiff  
12 and Class Members, Plaintiff and Class Members would not have been injured.

13 175. The injury and harm suffered by Plaintiff and Class Members was the reasonably  
14 foreseeable result of Defendant's breach of their duties. Defendant knew or should have known  
15 that it was failing to meet its duties, and that Defendant's breach would cause Plaintiff and Class  
16 Members to experience the foreseeable harms associated with the exposure and compromise of  
17 their Private Information.

18 176. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligent conduct, Plaintiff and  
19 Class Members have suffered injury and are entitled to compensatory, and consequential in an  
20 amount to be proven at trial.

**FOURTH COUNT**  
**Breach of Confidence**  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

177. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

178. At all times during Defendant's possession of Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information, Defendant was fully aware of the confidential and sensitive nature of Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information.

179. Defendant's relationship with Plaintiff and Class Members was governed by terms and expectations that Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information would be collected, stored, and protected in confidence, and would not be disclosed to unauthorized third parties.

180. Defendant voluntarily received in confidence Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information with the understanding that Private Information would not be disclosed or disseminated to the public or any unauthorized third parties.

181. Due to Defendant's failure to prevent and avoid the Data Breach from occurring, Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information was disclosed and misappropriated to unauthorized third parties beyond Plaintiff's and the Class Members' confidence, and without their express permission.

182. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's actions and/or omissions, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered damages.

183. But for Defendant's disclosure of Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information in violation of the parties' understanding of confidence, their Private Information

1 would not have been compromised, stolen, viewed, accessed, and used by unauthorized third  
2 parties. Defendant's Data Breach was the direct and legal cause of the theft of Plaintiff's and the  
3 Class Members' Private Information as well as the resulting damages.

4 184. The injury and harm Plaintiff and Class Members suffered was the reasonably  
5 foreseeable result of Defendant's unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff's and the Class Members'  
6 Private Information. Defendant knew or should have known its methods of accepting and  
7 securing Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information was inadequate as it relates to,  
8 at the very least, securing servers and other equipment containing Plaintiff's and the Class  
9 Members' Private Information.  
10

11 185. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of its confidence with  
12 Plaintiff and the Class, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and will suffer injury,  
13 including but not limited to: (i) actual identity theft; (ii) the loss of the opportunity how their PII  
14 is used; (iii) the compromise, publication, and/or theft of their PII; (iv) out-of-pocket expenses  
15 associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, tax fraud, and/or  
16 unauthorized use of their Private Information; (v) lost opportunity costs associated with effort  
17 expended and the loss of productivity addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual present  
18 and future consequences of the Data Breach, including but not limited to efforts spent  
19 researching how to prevent, detect, contest, and recover from tax fraud and identity theft; (vi)  
20 costs associated with placing freezes on credit reports; (vii) the continued risk to their Private  
21 Information, which remain in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized  
22 disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect  
23 the Private Information of Plaintiff and the Class; and (viii) present and future costs in terms of  
24  
25  
26

1 time, effort, and money that will be expended to prevent, detect, contest, and repair the impact of  
 2 the Private Information compromised as a result of the Data Breach for the remainder of the lives  
 3 of Plaintiff and the Class.

4 186. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breaches of confidence, Plaintiff  
 5 and Class Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm,  
 6 including, but not limited to, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and other economic and  
 7 non-economic losses.  
 8

#### 9 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

10 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, prays for  
 11 relief as follows:

- 12 A. For an Order certifying this case as a class action and appointing Plaintiff and  
 13 Plaintiff's counsel to represent the Class;  
 14  
 15 B. For equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct  
 16 complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of Plaintiff's and  
 17 Class Members' Private Information, and from refusing to issue prompt, complete  
 18 and accurate disclosures to Plaintiff and Class Members;  
 19  
 20 C. For equitable relief compelling Defendant to utilize appropriate methods and  
 21 policies with respect to consumer data collection, storage, and safety, and to  
 22 disclose with specificity the type of PII compromised during the Data Breach;  
 23  
 24 D. For equitable relief requiring restitution and disgorgement of the revenues  
 25 wrongfully retained as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct;  
 26

- 1 E. Ordering Defendant to pay for not less than three years of credit monitoring  
2 services for Plaintiff and the Class;
- 3 F. Ordering Defendant to disseminate individualized notice of the Data Breach to all  
4 Class Members;
- 5 G. For an award of actual damages, compensatory damages, statutory damages, and  
6 statutory penalties, in an amount to be determined, as allowable by law;
- 7 H. For an award of attorneys' fees and costs, and any other expense, including expert  
8 witness fees;
- 9 I. Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded; and
- 10 J. Such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper.
- 11
- 12

13 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

14 Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury of all claims so triable.

15 Dated: November 7, 2022

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10 *\*Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming*

11 *Counsel for Plaintiff and Putative Class Members*